AD Petitioner Tells CIT No Need to Defer to US Interpretation of Affiliation Statute

Antidumping duty petitioner Ventura Coastal invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo -- which overturned the principle of Chevron deference -- to claim that the Court of International Trade doesn't need to adhere to the Commerce Department's interpretation of the statute "defining affiliation between parties" (Ventura Coastal v. U.S., CIT # 23-00009).

The high court last week said courts are no longer to defer to agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes but instead are to decide whether federal agencies have correctly regulated in line with congressional directives (see 2406280051). Ventura Coastal is the latest trade litigant to capitalize on the decision, citing the ruling in its challenge to the AD investigation on Brazilian lemon juice (see 2308040029).

Ventura brought the suit to argue that Commerce improperly found that exporter Louis Dreyfus Co. wasn't affiliated with its primarily fresh lemon supplier, leading to a de minimis rate for the company. In a July 3 notice of supplemental authority, the petitioner claimed that, due to the death of Chevron, no deference is owed to the government's read of the affiliation statute.

The U.S. interpreted the law to define "partners" and "any person who controls any other person and such other person" as parties that shall be considered "affiliated," citing Chevron for the idea that this interpretation is owed deference. Ventura said "the Court does not owe deference" to Commerce's interpretations of these terms and "should employ its interpretation of the term 'partners' under the statute."