BIS to Expand University Outreach Program, Offers Research Guidance

The Bureau of Industry and Security plans to expand its university outreach program to include more schools that may be working on export-controlled technologies, said Matt Axelrod, the agency’s top export enforcement official. Axelrod, speaking during an academic security seminar last week, also outlined the BIS compliance expectations for researchers, warning that not all fundamental research is exempt from export licensing requirements.

BIS last year reached out to 20 schools as part of its university outreach program (see 2206290019) -- aimed at improving compliance at universities that have an “elevated risk profile” for illegal tech transfers -- and is now “working on identifying additional universities who meet one or more of these criteria,” Axelrod said. The agency will reach out to those schools “in the near future,” he said during an annual seminar hosted by the Academic Security and Counter Exploitation Program.

Since introducing the program in June, BIS has assigned each of the 20 universities a dedicated “outreach agent” who meets with school officials quarterly, Axelrod said. The agency also has held two webinars to help the schools “identify” national security threats and better vet potential research partners. He said BIS plans to offer “broader training on regulatory requirements,” including on fundamental research, this spring.

“In an age where you can share even the most sensitive and valuable research in an email, over Zoom, or through visual inspection of certain manufacturing schematics,” Axelrod said, “our research universities must be relentless in their efforts to protect themselves.”

Universities for years have asked BIS not to place onerous export restrictions on fundamental research (see 2012020044, 2011130037 and 2207210026) -- research generally intended for widespread dissemination in the academic community -- saying license requirements could lead to less collaboration with international researchers and hurt U.S. ability to attract foreign students and faculty. Administration officials told researchers last year that the government was still running into challenging questions about whether and how its controls should apply to fundamental research (see 2205030045).

As long as researchers don’t “accept restrictions on publication for proprietary or national security reasons,” results of fundamental research “are generally not” subject to the Export Administration Regulations, Axelrod said. “Therefore, sharing technology or software that arises during, or results from, this research will likely not require a BIS export license."

But he warned that’s not always the case, adding that professors sometimes have a “misconception” that “any research destined to be published is wholly exempt from export controls.” Axelrod specifically pointed to government-funded research, which may not be considered fundamental research if it’s “protected by government-imposed access” or has “other specific national security controls.” Those controls may include “prepublication review requirements,” restrictions on sharing the research with non-U.S. citizens or only allowing U.S. citizens to work on the project.

Axelrod also said researchers may have to apply for a license “if there are any “changes during the research cycle.” Just because a project “falls within the definition of fundamental research at the outset, it does not mean that it will in the middle, or at the end, as publication decisions may shift,” he said.

If halfway through a fundamental research project, a researcher “sees a unique commercial use for the technology and decides that it is now proprietary information and will instead be protected,” the research will no longer be considered fundamental and may require an export license, Axelrod said. “For this reason, an assessment should be made at every stage or development" of a project involving fundamental research.

“The question of compliance does not just end once you determine that what you’re producing is considered fundamental research,” he said. “Instead, it comes down to the facts.”

Axelrod pointed to a 2021 case in which BIS fined Princeton University $54,000 and ordered it to audit its export control compliance program after the school illegally exported various strains of animal pathogens to foreign research institutions (see 2102020025). Axelrod didn’t name the recipient but said university staff “only realized their error during” an export control training session.

“This type of unforced error -- one that could have been avoided with a call to the right people at the outset -- underscores how important it is that everyone think about how export controls may relate to your research and have procedures in place to guide your staff."

Axelrod urged researchers to reach out to their university compliance teams or to BIS if they have questions about what they’re working on. Export controls “should be everybody’s concern, not just something your compliance team thinks about,” he said. “You don’t need to be an expert on the EAR, but you do need to know how to spot red flags and when to reach out to your export control officer for further guidance.”